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Abstract
The block cipher Rijndael was selected as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) by the National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) in 2001. Since the beginning of the selection process in 1997
researchers all over the world analyzed several aspects of the security of
AES.
In this thesis we focus on analyzing the so called tamper resistance
of AES, i.e., the security of AES against side channel attacks - a major
threat for the security of cryptographic algorithms. Firstly, we propose
a general but strong model to analyze the security of cryptographic al-
gorithms against side channel attacks. In our model we assume that an
adversary is able to obtain the values of some of the intermediate results
of AES encryptions with a secret key that is unknown to the adversary.
An algorithm is called secure in our model if the values of intermediate
results do not leak any information about the secret key. Hence, an al-
gorithm that is secure in our model provides security against most side
channel attacks. We propose a method to transform any algorithm that
is defined over a finite field into an algorithm that is secure in our model.
I.e., we present an algorithm for securely computing AES encryptions.
Secondly, we analyze a countermeasure called memory encryption that
is widely used on todays high security smart cards. We develop a new
class of fault attacks that is able to determine the secret key used in
an AES encryption even in the presence of memory encryption. Our
attack only needs a moderate number of fault inductions an hence shows
that memory encryption used in a straightforward manner may not be an
effective countermeasure.
In the last part of the thesis we analyze a special kind of side channel
attacks, so called cache base attacks (CBA). In a CBA the adversary can
exploit information about the cache behaviour of the processor during an
AES encryption to determine information about the secret key. We show
that a countermeasure based on random permutations as proposed in the
literature is not an effective countermeasure against CBAs. To do so we
present a CBA that determines the secret key efficiently. We improve
the proposed countermeasure by introducing a new class of permutations
called distinguished permutations. Using distinguished permuations in-
stead of random permutations can provably protect at least parts of the
secret key. Furthermore, we analyze the security of existing algorithms
for computing AES encryptions against CBAs. We also present new algo-
rithms that compute AES encryptions that provide a much better security
against CBAs.
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